Smart home networks have been recognized as one of its representative important applications in the forthcoming 5G era. It is also expected that in 5G networks, future smart home services will be much powered by mobility management, which enables users to remotely access and control their inhome Internet of Things (IoT) sensors and appliances anywhere anytime any device. As a major solution, Distributed IP Mobility Management (DMM) can be considered because it addresses the limitation of the centralized approaches as well as its flat architecture is suit for 5G networks. Obviously, without being protected, mobility management can cause smart home systems to be vulnerable to various security threats. Especially, it is of paramount important to protect data traffic transmitted between user mobile devices and their in-home IoT appliances because they include users' sensitive and critical privacy information. Taking this into consideration, it is necessary to support secure route optimization, which allows the involved devices to directly communicate each other in secure way while minimizing possibility of information leakage during data transmission. According to our best knowledge, there is no study on securing route optimization for DMM networks. Motivated by this, we propose a secure route optimization protocol for DMM-based smart home systems. The proposed security protocol, composed of the route optimization initialization and handover phases, is designed to provide mutual authentication, key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, and privacy protection. Its security is thoroughly verified through the two formal security analysis tools, BAN-logic and Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA). From the comparison analysis, it is shown that the proposed protocol is better than other standard protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobility management aims to enable each mobile node (MN) to get online regardless of its movement and location. With the advent of the 5G era, as expectations for innovative applications that go beyond existing limitations have increased, so its role as a key technology supporting these applications has become more and more important. Especially, mobility management is essential for emerging smart home networks which should support anytime, anywhere remote access to in-home Internet of Things (IoT) sensors and appliances by The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Shui Yu. users' mobile devices. It is highly predicted that Distributed IP Mobility Management (DMM) [1] , [2] will be adopted for the 5G networks and affiliated applications including smart home services. This is because its flat architecture is harmonized well with 5G networks while overcoming the critical shortcomings of the centralized mobility management technologies such as Mobile IPv6 [3] and Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [4] . Accordingly, 5G smart home networks will count on DMM to allow MNs to remotely access and control their corresponding nodes (CNs), i.e., in-home IoT sensors and appliances. On the other hand, needless to say, it is necessary to secure smart home networks, which can be otherwise faced with various security threats and attacks [5] - [12] . VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
In particular, remote access can be the most critical attack target because it is easy to access and control devices inside smart home networks once security is compromised. Moreover, during remote access, users' sensitive privacy information are typically included in data transmitted over smart home networks. Therefore, to support remote access, user data should be sent as securely as possible through an optimized path without any intermediate nodes while accompanied by strong mutual authentication. In other words, secure route optimization is essential for smart home networks. In mobility management, several secure route optimization protocols were proposed for MIPv6 and PMIPv6 [3] , [7] , [13] - [17] . Especially, in [7] , Shin et al. introduced a secure route optimization security protocol for smart home IoT networks. In this work, the proposed protocol relies on a centralized mobility anchor, based on PMIpv6 domain, to secure route optimization and manage seamless handover of MNs moving across different networks. A centralized approach is known to exhibit certain limitations such as scalability, single point of failure, etc. Accordingly, this paper acknowledges the DMM approach as solution to such problems. However, to take DMM into consideration, just few route optimization approaches were presented because it has not been yet finally standardized [18] , [19] . More importantly, to our best knowledge, there is no security study on DMM route optimization. Motivated by this, we propose a security protocol for route optimization in DMM-based smart home IoT networks. The proposed protocol consisting of two phases is designed to provide mutual authentication, key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, and privacy while defending against the resource exhaustion and malicious insider attacks. The contributions of this paper are three folds: (i) a secure route optimization for smart home IoT networks is proposed (ii) the proposed protocol is thoroughly verified with the two formal security verification tools, BAN-logic [20] and AVISPA [21] , and (iii) comparison analysis is done in terms of security properties, computation overhead and communication overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The section II provides both related works and problem statement. The proposed protocol is introduced and explained in the section III, and its formal verification is performed in the section IV. The comparison analysis is then presented in the section V, followed by the conclusion in the section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section describes related studies, which are classified into three parts: smart home security, PMIPv6 route optimization, and DMM. The problem state is then described.
A. RELATED WORKS 1) SMART HOME SECURITY In a smart home, it is necessary to secure the communication between in-home IoT devices and MNs. To this end, smart home security should thoroughly cover from data security to channel security. Especially, cloud computing can support such smart home security by deploying various platforms. Several researches have been conducted towards the smart home security as follows. Sivaraman et al. [22] focused on the security and privacy implications in the smart home IoT devices. The rating was discussed in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and access control, whose associated attacks were also highlighted. On the other hand, cloud-based platforms can act as the backbone of the future smart home while providing reliable and efficient services. Tao et al. [23] proposed a multilayer cloud architectural for reliable and efficient interactions between the heterogeneous IoT devices. The authors considered the ontology-based security framework for privacy and security in the interoperation of IoT devices. Chifor et al. [8] presented a device authorization scheme between smart home IoT devices and untrusted cloud systems. The authors not only adopted the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) protocol for user authentication to the devices, but also maintained the user anonymity. Jacobsson and Davidsson [24] proposed a privacy and security model for smart homes whose security was discussed with recent advancements. Sicato et al. [25] highlighted the cyber-attacks on smart home devices and focused on the VPNfilter malware in a smart home. Furthermore, Ali and Awad [26] concentrated on the vulnerability assessment of IoT based on smart home and investigated risk mitigation approaches. The current generation smart homes and their networks are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. Therefore, the single directional solutions towards security enhancements are not sufficient to secure them.
2) DISTRIBUTED IP MOBILITY MANAGEMENT
Nowadays centralized mobility management techniques including MIPv6 and PMIPv6 are mainly used in real worlds. However, these techniques have the following problems. First, all the traffics generated in MNs are concentrated to their anchor such as Home Agent (HA) or Local Mobility Anchor (LMA), which may cause network failure due to the overload of the anchor. Second, there is a limitation in expanding the network by increasing the load on the anchor because the amount of both signaling messages and data traffic exponentially increases in proportion to the number of MNs. Third, since data traffics are mainly transmitted through the anchor, such transmission can lead to an inefficient path such as triangular routing. In other words, centralized mobility management can provide convenience to mobility management in a hierarchical network structure, but there are performance or scalability issues, and anchors are the main cause of malicious attacks because all management is handled by a single anchor and easily targeted. To address these limitations, the IETF has launched the Distributed IP Mobility Management Working Group 1 since 2012 to standardize distributed Internet mobility management techniques. DMM distributes the centralized anchor's functionality to perform network functions independently in several places. For this goal, it is configured by separating the data plane (responsible for data traffic) and the control plane (responsible for signaling for mobility management). Decentralization of the data plane provides flexibility in the data flow, and reduces the probability of overload by not only preventing a single anchor from being focused on, but also distributing tunneling operations. Also, it can exhibit improved performance with low communication delay by excluding a centralized anchor from data transmission. Hence, it is highly expected that DMM will be a dominant mobility management standard for the next generation mobile networks, i.e., the forthcoming 5G/6G networks. In particular, similar to Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [4] , networkbased DMM gains considerable attentions because of running mobility management without MNs' involvement. In order to reduce anchor loads, this network-based approach centralizes and distributes the control and data planes respectively by employing Centralized Mobility Database (CMD), which stores and manages MNs' mobility information. Consequently, network-based DMM is adopted for our research.
3) ROUTE OPTIMIZATION SECURITY
Since the introduction to MIPv6, the first IPv6 mobility management solution, route optimization security has been one of important challenges. In MIPv6, the Return Routeability (RR) scheme is included as a basic route optimization security option. In spite of its simple structure and easy key management, this scheme contains fatal weaknesses in terms of security and performance. As an alternative to the RR protocol, the Enhanced Route Optimization (ERO) scheme was proposed and standardized [13] . The ERO scheme consists of the initial and subsequent stages. In the former, a binding management key is strongly exchanged based on addressbased public-key encryption scheme named ''Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA),'' [27] . In the latter, a route optimization is efficiently executed based on the negotiated strong key. Moreover, the ERO scheme minimizes the binding update latency through the early binding update scheme, which simultaneously performs the binding update and data transfer. This creates a trade-off between performance and security. Basically, it is assumed in MIPv6 that there is no global security infrastructure and the two nodes MN and CN have no trust relation (the aforementioned RR and ERO are also designed under that assumption). However, in 2006, the Static Shared Key (SSK) scheme [14] was proposed as the route optimization standard in consideration of the case where there is a trust relationship between the involved MN and CN. Note that such a situation fits into our smart home environment because it is necessary to setup a pretrust relationship for the involved entities. In this scheme, it is assumed that a shared secret is established between MN and CN in advance. Once a handover happens, an optimized binding update of one round-trip is executed based on the pre-shared key between the two nodes. However, the SSK scheme suffers from key distribution and management because each MN should directly establish trust relation in advance with its associated CN. In order to overcome this limitation, TBUA [15] , a ticket-based binding renewal authentication protocol, was proposed. Especially it employs HA as a ticket issuer to address the burden on key distribution and management while adopting the early binding update to decrease the binding update latency. Afterwards, caTBUA [16] was proposed to enhance TBUA based on the context-aware authentication approach to keep the best balance between security and efficiency. Note that the schemes mentioned above aim to protect the route optimization of MIPv6, which is host based.
On the other hand, several schemes were proposed for the route optimization of PMIPv6, the current widely used mobility management standard [28] , [29] . All of them focus only on communication efficiency, thus not satisfying the security requirements for smart home environments. In 2017, Shin et al. [7] presented the secure route optimization protocol for the PMIPv6 based smart home security, which achieves security and efficiency. As a potent successor of PMIPv6, DMM successfully has gained popularity, but still has not been standardized, thus leading to just a few of route optimization schemes [18] , [19] , whose focus is just on efficiency. To our best knowledge, there is no study on security for DMM route optimization, which is especially suit for smart home IoT networks. Clearly, based on the expectation that DMM will be the main mobility management scheme for 5G/6G networks, it is significant to research DMM route optimization and its security.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The communication between MN and CN (i.e. in-home IoT device) in a basic DMM-based smart home IoT network is shown in Figure 1 . Through two intermediary entities Mobility Gateway (MGW) and CMD, MN can communicate with CN regardless of its location and movement. In this smart home network, Home Gateway (HGW) is employed to serve as a bridge for communication between in-home IoT devices and external MNs. In more detail, all data traffics are transmitted between the associated MN and CN through tunneling generated between MGW and HGW. However, if MN moves to another network, its data traffics arrived at the old MGW or departed from the new MGW should be further forwarded between these two MGWs. Consequently, every time a handover occurs, such indirect routing degrades the overall network performance, leading to route optimization problems and excessive-performance loads. In order to address this problem, it is necessary to study the route optimization for DMM. On the other hand, the DMM-based smart home IoT network can be faced with various attacks such as redirection attack if its route optimization is not properly protected. In addition, data transmitted over smart home networks contains users' sensitive privacy information, whose leakage can result in fatal consequences. Accordingly, such data should be transmitted as securely as possible through an optimized path without any intermediate nodes, which means the truly secure route optimization. For that, the involved MGW and HGW should mutually authenticate each other while negotiating a master session key, from which sub-session keys are derived to protect the data traffics transmitted over smart home networks. Such security association should be established between new MGW and HGW whenever MN moves to new network. To support MGW and HGW to build their security association strong enough for the route optimization, we can take into consideration the well-known standard security protocols including EAP-TLS [30] , EAP-AKA [31] , EAP-IKEv2 [32] , and so forth. Unfortunately, they cannot completely satisfy the security requirements specific for smart home networks, which are defined in the next section. That leads to us researching a new security protocol to protect the route optimization for DMM-based smart home IoT networks.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, a secure route optimization protocol is proposed for DMM-based Smart Home IoT Networks. The proposed protocol includes two phases: the route optimization initialization (RO_INIT) and handover (RO_HO) phases. Table 1 shows the notations that are used in representing the proposed protocol. The assumptions made on the proposed protocol are as follows:
• It is assumed that the mobile network operators to which MNs belong provides a smart home cloud service supporting distributed mobility management.
• It is assumed that the MN user subscribes to a smart home cloud service, thereby establishing a trust relation between her or his own home network and the DMM-based mobile networks based on which that cloud service runs. In more detail, during the initial enrolment, the user's home gateway HGW shares the authentication and cipher keys, K HC and K EHC , with the context mobility database CMD in the DMM-based networks.
• It is assumed that during the initial enrolment, a route optimization policy is configured between each HGW and its corresponding DMM-based mobile networks.
• It is assumed that in DMM-based mobile networks, each MGW pre-establishes a secure channel with CMD based on the IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [33] in a way that the confidentiality and integrity of data being transferred are guaranteed.
• It is assumed that the communication between MGWs is protected by the pre-established IPSec ESP-based secure channel. Therefore, each MN's important handover and route optimization information are securely transmitted from the current MGW to the next MGW. The proposed protocol targets the following security requirements:
• Mutual Authentication: For secure route optimization, HGW and MGW should mutually authenticate each other.
• Key Exchange: HGW and MGW should securely negotiate session keys to protect the route optimization process as well as the succeeding data transmission.
• Perfect Forward Secrecy: Since the security of data being transmitted between MN and CN is critical, the session key utilized to protect this transmission must support perfect forward secrecy. Even if the long term keys as well as the current and future session keys to be shared between HGW and CMD or between HGW and MGW are exposed, it must be impossible to recover the old session keys used to protect data from the past.
• Privacy: The MN's identity must not be revealed on the messages being exchanged between CMD and HGW or between MGW and HGW during the route optimization.
• Defense against resource exhaustion attack: Resource exhaustion attack is a kind of DoS attack that leads victims to an excessive utilization of its resources. The proposed protocol must not be vulnerable to DoS attack that causes the involved entities to suffer from expensive public key operations.
• Defense against attacks by malicious MGW: The proposed protocol must respond to the threat of re-direction attack by the malicious MGW. In order to achieve the security requirements explained above, the proposed protocol protects the route optimization by performing session key exchange using the Diffie-Hellman protocol on the basis of the trust relationship between CMD and HGW.
A. ROUTE OPTIMIZATION INITIALIZATION PHASE (RO_INIT)
The RO_INIT phase, shown in Figure 2 , aims to securely set up the router optimization between MN and its smart home network. For such a goal, this phase counts on the long term secret keys, K HC and K EHC , pre-shared between HGW and CMD. Assume that the communication between MN and CN, i.e., smart home IoT device, via HGW is in progress prior to this phase. If MN has appropriate rights to participate in the route optimization, HGW monitors data traffics in order to make decision whether the route optimization is necessary or not. HGW starts the RO_INIT phase in the case that a route optimization is necessary. Once contacted by HGW, CMD checks the MN's route optimization policy to decide whether to proceed the requested route optimization or not. If available, it gets from its policy store both the HGW information (HGW address, K HC , K EHC , etc.) and the current MGW information (MGW address, K MGWi , etc.), which are associated with MN.
The detailed description of this phase, outlined in Figure 2 , is as follows.
1) Once deciding that a route optimization is necessary, HGW starts this phase by sending CMD the HC_Auth_Req message, which includes ID HGW and EMSG 1 . For this, HGW uses K EHC to encrypt the values ID HGW , ID MN , n 1 , ts 1 and HM 1 into EMSG 1 after preparing for the randomly generated nonce n 1 and the current timestamp ts 1 as well as computing HM 1 = HMAC(K HC , ID HGW || ID MN ||n 1 ||ts 1 ). Here, it is worth to note that the MN's privacy holds because ID MN is encrypted. On receiving the message, CMD first gets the two secret keys K EHC and K HC through ID HGW , and then decrypts EMSG 1 with K EHC . Afterwards, it checks if ID HGW and ID MN are valid as well as ts 1 is within its time window, and verifies HM 1 with K HC . If the above verification is positive, CMD successfully authenticates HGW based on the two keys K EHC and K HC . Moreover, it can defend against the reply attacks based on the ts 1 's freshness. 2) After finishing to verify the the HC_Auth_Req message, CMD randomly generates n 2 and creates the session key K RO by computing HMAC(K HC , n 1 ||n 2 || ''RO Init Key''), followed by issuing the ticket T HGW . Finally, it computes HM 2 = HMAC(K HC , ID CMD ||ID MGW1 || ID MN ||n 1 ||n 2 ||T HGW ) prior to sending the HC_Auth_Res message to HGW. On arrival of the message, HGW verifies if the included n 1 matches the original one sent by itself and then HM 2 is valid. If the verification is successful, it can authenticate CMD as well as prevent the reply attack with the help of the n 1 's freshness. 3) In order to prepare for the HM_Auth_Req message, HGW computes the session key K RO and randomly generates the nonce n 3 . It also creates its Diffie-Hellman private key X and calculates the corresponding public key g X . After computing HM 3 , it contacts 4) The valid HM 3 allows MGW 1 to safely perform the expensive public key computations for Diffie-Hellman key exchange without being vulnerable to the resource exhaustion attack. Thus, MGW 1 proceeds to calculate its private and public keys Y and g Y , and in turn makes n 4 and g XY , from which the master session key MSK 1 is then derived. Finally, the two HMAC values HM 4 and HM 5 are computed to compose and send the HM_Auth_Req message. Here, the former confirms the MGW 1 's ownership of the master session key MSK 1 and the latter helps HGW to perform the Diffie-Hellman key exchange without being vulnerable to the resource exhaustion attack. As soon as receiving the HM_Auth_Req message, HGW attempts to verify the included HM 5 , whose successful result enables HGW to securely get the master session key MSK 1 by computing HMAC(K RO , g XY ||n 3 ||n 4 || ''Master Session Key'') as mentioned above. If such a verification is successful and thus MSK 1 is obtained, HGW tries to confirm that MGW 1 owns MSK 1 by validating HM 4 with it. In the case that both the two HMACs are valid, HGW can believe the MGW 1 's ownership of MSK 1 , and successfully authenticate MGW 1 .
5) HGW concludes this phase by responding with the
HM_Auth_Confim message that contains ID HGW , n 4 and HM 6 to MGW 1 . The inclusion of n 4 and HM 6 allows MGW 1 to validate that the last message is fresh and assure that the key exchange has been securely and successfully performed respectively. In more detail, MGW 1 finally confirms that HGW has MSK 1 , and thus is ready for the secure route optimization. As the final step, HGW and MGW 1 completely delete their Diffie-Hellman key pairs that were used to generate MSK 1 to support the perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
B. ROUTE OPTIMIZATION HANDOVER PHASE (RO_HO)
A secure route optimization must be continuously supported whenever an MN transfers from one MGW to another. For this reason, the Route Optimization Handover (RO_HO) phase, as shown in Figure 3 , is designed. In this phase, the new MGW, to which the MN moves, securely gets the session key from its CMD, and then depends on that key to perform the mutual authentication and key exchange with the MN's HGW. This phase is described in detail as follows: verifies that the two timestamps ts 1 and ts 2 are valid and computes SK i , then validating HM 1 and HM 2 by using MSK i−1 and SK i respectively. As mentioned above, if the timestamps and the HMAC values are correct, HGW can trust that the previous and new MGWs agree with the MN's handover and the route optimization needs to be continued. That makes it possible for HGW to prevent a malicious MGW from deceiving itself into redirecting the MN's data traffic. Moreover, with the help of HM 2 , HGW can defend against the reply, man-in-the middle, and resource exhaustion attacks. 6) If the HM_Auth_Req message is valid, MGW i generates the random nonce n 2 and its own Diffie-Hellman public key pair Y and g Y , followed by deriving the ith master session key MSK i through HMAC(SK i , g XY ||n 1 ||n 2 || ''Master Session Key''). At this point, HGW can count on HM 2 to prevent the man-in-the middle and resource exhaustion attacks caused by the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Afterwards,MSK i and SK i are utilized to compute the two HMAC values HM 3 and HM 4 . The first value confirms that HGW has MSK i while the second value allows MGW i−1 to safely performs the expensive public key operations. Finally, HGW sends MGW i the HM_Auth_Res message. Upon receipt of the HM_Auth_Res message, MGW i checks if the received n 1 is same as the original one that it sent and validates HM 4 with SK i . If correct, it performs the Diffie-Hellman key exchange to get MSK i , which is then used to verify HM 3 . In the case that HM 3 is valid, MGW i can authenticate HGW while confirming that HGW owns MSK i . 7) MGW i concludes the handover process by sending HGW the HM_Auth_Confirm message protected by HM 5 . On receiving this message, HGW verifies if the included n 2 is equal to the original one sent by itself and HM 5 is correct. If this verification is successful, MGW i can be authenticated to HGW, which thus confirms the MGW i 's ownership of MSK i . In order to support the perfect forward secrecy, the two parties remove their public key pair. As the result of this phase, MGW i and HGW successfully performs the mutual authentication and key exchange after the DMM based binding update procedure.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION
In this section, the proposed protocol is formally verified through BAN-logic [20] , [34] and AVISPA [21] . These two verification methods could complement the weaknesses of each other, hence employing these tools provide a more extensive and robust verification of the proposed protocol.
A. FORMAL VERIFICATION WITH BAN-LOGIC
BAN-logic, presented by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham, has been one of the most popular formal security verification methods owing to its simplicity, intuitive, and robust [7] , [35] , [36] . Tables 2 and 3 show the notations and inference rules of BAN logic.
For a formal verification based on BAN-logic, a security protocol is first translated into an idealized version and its assumptions and goals are defined, followed by repeated applications of the inference rules until the intended beliefs are obtained.
1) RO-INIT PHASE
As the first step, the RO-INIT phase is idealized as follow.
Based on the idealized form, the following assumptions are made.
(A1) CMD believes CMD K EHC
←→ HGW (A2) CMD believes #(ts 1 ) (A3)CMD believes CMD K HC ⇐⇒ HGW (A4) HGW believes CMD K HC ⇐⇒ HGW (A5) HGW believes #(n 1 ) (A6) HGW believes CMD controlsMGW 1 VOLUME 7, 2019 In addition, we define the 15 goals as shown below.
(G1) CMD believes HGW believes ID MN (G2) MGW 1 believes CMD believes ID MN (G3) CMD believes HGW believes ID HGW (G4) HGW believes CMD believes ID CMD (G5) HGW believes CMD believes T HGW (G6) MGW 1 believes HGW believes ID HGW (G7) HGW believes MGW 1 
⇐⇒ HGW
Here, (G1) and (G2) mean that the route optimization for the MN is accepted by CMD and MGW 1 , and (G5) is the basis for HGW to continue the steps (3)-(5) with MGW 1 . In addition, (G3) and (G4) show the successful mutual authentication between CMD and HGW while (G6) and (G7) show the successful mutual authentication between MGW 1 and HGW. Finally, (G8)-(G15) indicate that K RO and MSK 1 are successfully exchanged between MGW 1 and HGW.
From (I1), we derive:
(D1)CMD sees{ID HGW , ID MN , n 1 , ts 
⇐⇒ HGW by (D41), BC
It is shown from the above derived beliefs (D1)-(D43) that the RO-INIT phase achieves the goals (G1)-(G15). Moreover, we can obtain the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: The RO-INIT phase provides mutual authentication.
Proof: The derived beliefs (D8) and (D11) show that CMD and HGW mutually authenticate each other. On the other hand, we can see from (D23) and (D31) that based on K RO , MGW 1 and HGW mutually authenticate each other. These beliefs are strengthened by (D31) and (D38), which also show the mutual authentication between MGW 1 and HGW based on MSK 1 . Because MSK 1 is negotiated based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, (D31) and (D38), without being just redundant, can guarantee that the mutual authentication is strong enough for the route optimization. As a result, it is concluded that the RO-INIT phase achieves mutual authentication.
Lemma 2: The session keys K RO and MSK 1 are successfully exchanged between MGW 1 and HGW.
Proof: HGW is based on (D14) and (D35) to believe that the session keys K RO and MSK 1 are securely exchanged between itself and MGW 1 . Such a belief is enhanced and completed through (D32) and (D39), which indicates that HGW believes the correspondent's belief on the keys. Similarly, it is sure from (D19), (D24), (D27), and (D43), i.e., the MGW 1 's direct and indirect beliefs on K RO and MSK 1 , that it securely negotiates the keys with HGW. Therefore, we can show that the session keys K RO and MSK 1 are successfully exchanged between MGW 1 and HGW.
Lemma 3: The RO-INIT phase provides the perfect forward secrecy.
Proof: It can be seen from (D25) and (D33) that MGW 1 negotiates g XY with MGW 1 by employing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. After this key agreement, the two parties remove their private key so that g XY cannot be recovered even though some or all of the secret keys K HC , K EHC , and K RO are exposed. Hence, we can say that g XY and MSK 1 , which is derived from g XY , are protected with the perfect forward secrecy. As a result, it is concluded that the RO-INIT phase achieves the perfect forward secrecy because the route optimization is secured based on MSK 1 after that phase.
Lemma 4: The RO-INIT phase preserves MN's privacy. Proof: In order to obtain (D3), the CMD's belief on ID MN , the message meaning rule is first applied to the encrypted message {ID HGW , ID MN , n 1 , ts 1 , HM 1 }K EHC . Thus, this belief indicates that ID MN is known to CMD without being exposed. On the other hand, the MGW 1 's belief (D17) is gained from T HGW , which is encrypted with K MGW 1 . Similar to (D3), it thus shows that ID MN is securely transmitted to MGW 1 . As a result, during the RO-INIT phase, no external entity knows the MN's identifier ID MN . That makes it possible to conclude that MN's privacy is preserved in this phase.
Lemma 5: The RO-INIT phase defends against resource exhaustion attack.
Proof: According to (D10) and (D30), HGW successfully verifies HM 2 and HM 5 so that it can generate its own public key pair X and g X as well as perform the Diffie-Hellman key agreement without being vulnerable to resource exhaustion attack. In the same way, MGW 1 first verifies the ticket T HGW , and then performs the public key operations, thereby preventing resource exhaustion attack. From (D16), it is demonstrated that such a verification is successfully performed. Consequently, we can show that the RO-INIT phase defends against resource exhaustion attack.
Lemma 6: The RO-INIT phase defends against malicious MGW.
Proof: In order to be successfully involved in the RO-INIT phase, MGW 1 should be first contacted by HGW, receive T HGW , and show that it knows K RO . Because this phase just initializes the route optimization between HGW and its intended MGW 1 , it is impossible for a malicious MGW to redirect MN's traffic by deceiving HGW. (D16) shows that the ticket T HGW can be decrypted and verified by only the intended MGW 1 having K MGW 1 . Moreover, (D19) shows that the intended MGW 1 obtains K RO . Note that even though MGW 1 is malicious, it is limited to freely lunch attacks at its will. Accordingly, we can conclude that the RO-INIT phase defends against malicious MGW.
Lemma 7: The RO-INIT phase provides confidentiality and integrity.
Proof: Confidentiality indicates that session keys are effectively exchanged between involved entities without any leakage as well as ID MN is not exposed (i.e., privacy is kept). It has been shown in Lemma 2 that session keys K RO and MSK 1 are securely exchanged and can be enhanced through Lemma 3 in a way that perfect forward secrecy is guaranteed by the deletion of the private key used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Moreover, the privacy can be supported through Lemma 4 in which no external entity can know the MN's identifier ID MN . On the other hand, integrity indicates that the HMAC values HM1-HM6 are valid. It can be shown from the obtained beliefs (D4), (D10), (D22), D(30), D(36) and D(41) that the value of all HMACs are correct, which subsequently proves support to the integrity requirement. Accordingly, we can conclude that the RO-INIT phase provides confidentiality and integrity.
2) RO-HO PHASE
The formal verification for the RO-HO phase is started by idealizing and defining the assumptions as shown below. 
In addition, the following goals are set where (G16)-(G17) indicate the mutual authentication between MGW i and HGW, (G18)-(G21) mean the session key MSK i exchange between MGW i and HGW, and (G22)-(G23) express HGW's belief on the involved MGWs' agreement on MN's handover. Note that (G22)-(G23) are specially added to formally verify if the RO-HO phase can prevent a legitimate but malicious MGW's attack by counting on HM 1 and HM 2 . Consequently, the above verification shows that the RO-HO phase can fulfil the goals (G16)-(G23). Moreover, we can derive the following lemmas from (D44)-(D69).
(G16) HGW believes MGW i believes ID MGW
Lemma 8: The RO-HO phase provides mutual authentication.
Proof: The obtained beliefs (D48), (D57), (D64), and (D68) show that MGW i and HGW mutually authenticate each other. Note that (D48) and (D57) are derived based on SK i while (D64), and (D68) are derived based on MSK i . That is, the former is enhanced by the latter because MSK i is strongly negotiated through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Consequently, we can conclude that the RO-HO phase provides mutual authentication.
Lemma 9: The session key MSK i is successfully exchanged between MGW i and HGW.
Proof: According to (D51) and (D61), MGW i and HGW believe that MSK 1 is successfully negotiated between themselves. Such a belief is evolved through the indirect belief that each party believes its correspondent's belief on MSK 1 . That makes it possible to prove that MSK 1 are successfully exchanged between MGW i and HGW.
Lemma 10: The RO-HO phase provides the perfect forward secrecy.
Proof: (D50) and (D60) show that g XY is established between MGW i and HGW through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Note that the private keys X and Y are immediately removed from the two parties to prevent g XY from being recovered in any case. Accordingly, we can conclude that MSK i derived from g XY is protected with the perfect forward secrecy. Consequently, it is demonstrated that the RO-HO phase provides the perfect forward secrecy because MSK i is utilized to protect the route optimization.
Lemma 11: The RO-HO phase preserves MN's privacy. Proof: During the RO-HO phase, MN's identifier ID MN is not used and exposed. Therefore, we can say that the RO-HO phase preserves MN's privacy.
Lemma 12: The RO-HO phase defends against resource exhaustion attack.
Proof: Similar to the RO-INIT phase, this phase prevents the resource exhaustion attack by ensuring that MGW i and HGW perform the Diffie-Hellman key agreement only if the relevant HMAC value is valid. Details are as follows. During the binding update procedure, MGW i needs to check if ts 2 is within its time window. Only if the timestamp is fresh, MGW i prepares for the next message while generating its its public key pair. In addition, based on (D46) showing HM 2 is valid, HGW can safely perform the required public key operations. At last, according to (D56), while trusting HM 2 , MGW i performs the key agreement, thus not being vulnerable to the resource exhaustion attack. From the above, we can conclude that the RO-HO phase defends against resource exhaustion attack.
Lemma 13: The RO-HO phase defends against malicious MGW.
Proof: In this phase, HGW verifies both the two HMAC values HM 1 and HM 2 , which are computed by MGW i−1 and MGW i respectively. In other words, this phase can be advanced after confirming that the two involved MGW agree MN's handover. Such agreement, shown through (D47) and (D53), can prevent a malicious MGW from freely attempting at its will to trick HGW into redirecting MN's traffic at its will. As a result, we can conclude that the RO-HO phase defends against malicious MGW. Proof: Confidentiality indicates that session key is effectively exchanged between involved entities without any leakage. It has been shown in Lemma 9 that session key MSK i is securely exchanged and can be enhanced through Lemma 10 in a way that perfect forward secrecy is guaranteed by the deletion of private key use in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. On the other hand, integrity indicates that HMAC values HM1 -HM5 are valid. It can be shown from the obtained beliefs (D46), (D52), (D56), (D63), and (D67) that the value of all HMACs are correct, which subsequently proves support to the integrity requirement. Accordingly, we can conclude that the RO-HO phase provides confidentiality and integrity.
B. FORMAL VERIFICATION WITH AVISPA
Here, a formal verification is performed on the proposed security protocol through a security analysis automation tool known as Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) [7] . AVISPA is utilized to specify security protocols, along with the desired security properties, to analyze their flaws. For AVISPA based verification, a protocol first needs to be modelled in High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL), which is an AVISPA role-based language. Then, the HLPSL model is automatically converted to an intermediate format (IF) using HLPSL2IF translator, as shown in Figure 4 . The converted in Figures 16 and 17 . According to the verification results, both the RO-INIT and RO-HO phases of the protocol are safe against known attacks.
V. COMPARISON ANALYSIS
In this section, the proposed protocol is compared with the widely used standard security protocols EAP-TLS [30] , EAP-AKA [31] , and EAP-IKEv2 [32] that can be applied to protect the route optimization between MGW and HGW. Table 4 gives a comparative analysis among the proposed protocol and other three security standards based on security properties. From this analysis, we can see that EAP-TLS, EAP-AKA, and EAP-IKEv2 don't support privacy while not preventing attacks by malicious MGWs. Additionally, EAP-TLS and EAP-AKA don't support perfect forward secrecy while EAP-TLS and EAP-IKEv2 are susceptible to resource exhaustion attacks. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the proposed protocol offers better security than others. On the other hand, the proposed protocol is compared with other standard security protocols in terms of computation overhead as shown in Table 5 .
Note that the total computation costs for EAP-AKA, EAP-TLS, and EAP-IKEv2 are 2C SHA1 + 16C HM , 2C CV + 2C AS + 1C SV + 1C DS + 6C HM + 4C SHA1 , and 2C DH +2C HM + 6C SYM +2C DS + 2C SV , respectively. Meanwhile, those of the RO-INIT and RO-HO phases are 16C HM + 4C SYM + 2C DH and 13 HM + 2C DH , respectively. It is thus observed that the computation cost of the proposed protocol is better than other public key based schemes EAP-TLS and EAL-IKEv2. Even though EAP-AKA has lower computation overhead than others, its security is not enough to support the route in DMM optimization based smart home networks.
Lastly, the communication overhead was also compared among the proposed protocol and other security protocols in terms of roundtrip time. Compared to other protocols, the proposed protocol achieves the best network latency.
VI. CONCLUSION
For 5G emerging smart home networks, it is of paramount importance to provide remote access in a secure and efficient way. Aiming at such remote access, this paper presents a secure route optimization protocol in smart home networks based on DMM that is highly expected to be a major mobility management solution in 5G era. Based on the formal security analysis with BAN-logic and AVISPA, it is proved that the proposed protocol is correct. In addition, the derived 12 lemmas show that it provides mutual authentication, key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, and privacy while defending against the resource exhaustion attack and the attack by malicious MGW. Finally, we can see that the proposed proto-col in comparative analysis is better than other approaches including EAP-AKA, EAP-TLS, and EAP-IKEv2 given a comprehensive consideration of security properties, computational overhead, and communication overhead. In future, the proposed protocol will be implemented in a real testbed with varying traffic to measure the actual network performance and computation overhead. Moreover, we will extend the proposed protocol to both 5G architectures, Standalone and Non-Standalone.
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